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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine Agamben’s engagement with economic 
theology in order to underscore its relevance for the critique of contemporary neoliberal 
politics. In the first part, I offer a summary of the central arguments of The Kingdom and the 
Glory. In particular, I focus on both the treatment of the notion of oikonomia in the early 
Christian discussions on the divine trinity and its relation to the providential paradigm of 
government. I then show how this genealogy of oikonomia is useful for a political analysis     
of the present. In doing so, I respond to some of the criticisms leveled against Agamben’s The 
Kingdom and the Glory by Alberto Toscano. Finally, I will conclude by showing how Agamben’s 
work is of particular importance for the study of neoliberal political rationality.  
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In The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government, Agamben 
inquires into the reasons why, at least in the West, “power has assumed the form of oikonomia, 
that is, a government of men” (Agamben 2011, xi). Indeed, through an archaeological 
investigation into economic theology Agamben examines the articulation of the two different 
polarities that constitute what he calls the “governmental machine”: the transcendental pole 
of sovereignty and the immanent pole of the administration, the Kingdom and the 
Government. In contrast to the special focus Agamben had previously given to the juridical-
institutional pole of sovereignty (Agamben 1998; Agamben 2005), the strong emphasis in this 
work on the economy highlights the immanent order over the transcendent norm, re-
orienting sovereignty towards an understanding of government. 
The world, writes Agamben, is “governed through the coordination of two 
principles, the auctoritas (that is, a power without actual execution) and the potestas (that is,       
a power that can be exercised); the Kingdom and the Government” (Agamben 2011, 103). 
This thesis, which is developed in The Kingdom and the Glory, signals a major shift in the 
treatment of power as a category of analysis in the Homo sacer series:  
If it appears in Homo Sacer I that the double articulation of inside and outside produces 
power which then grounds the political, The Kingdom and the Glory radically modifies 
this claim by showing how government effectively produces the power which grounds 
it, making the kingdom (sovereign power) operative through the inoperability of the 
power of Glory (Walkin 2014, 211).  
Agamben’s genealogy of economic theology highlights this complex bipolar structure of 
power that underpins the historical tensions between sovereignty and government, providing 
an insightful framework from which to understand the neoliberal political rationality and the 
emergence of governance as its primary administrative form. The aim of this paper is 
therefore to examine Agamben’s engagement with economic theology in order to underscore 
its relevance for the critique of contemporary neo-liberal politics. 
In the first part of this work, I offer a summary of the central arguments of the first 
part of The Kingdom and the Glory. In particular I focus on both the treatment of the notion of 
oikonomia in the early Christian discussions on the divine trinity, and its relation to the 
providential paradigm of government. I then show how this genealogy of oikonomia is useful 
for a political analysis of the present. In doing so I also respond to some of the criticisms 
leveled against Agamben’s The Kingdom and the Glory by Alberto Toscano (2011). I conclude by 
showing how Agamben’s work is of particular importance for the study of the neoliberal 
political rationality.  
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A genealogy of economic theology: on the fracture between Being and Action 
As Agamben notes, Foucault’s historical investigations into the government of man and 
things “were only the shadow of his theoretical questioning of the present” (Agamben 2007, 
1). In Agamben’s case, this shadow is prolonged until it reaches the beginnings of Christian 
theology. While Agamben locates his own work on the governmental machine in “the wake 
of Michel Foucault’s investigations into the genealogy of governmentality” (Agamben 2011, 
xi), he dislocates Foucault’s work into a larger context by digging into a path that was not 
available to Foucault (cf. Dean 2013, 167). In The Kingdom and the Glory this path opens with 
the identification of two political paradigms – functionally related to one another but yet 
antinomical – derived from Christian theology:  
Political theology, which founds the transcendence of sovereign power on the single 
God, and economic theology, which replaces this transcendence with the idea of an 
oikonomia, conceived as an immanent ordering – domestic and political in strict sense – 
of both divine and human life. Political philosophy and the modern theory of the 
sovereignty derive from the first paradigm; modern biopolitics up to the current 
triumph of economy and government over every other aspect of social life derive 
from the second paradigm (Agamben 2011, 1). 
While modern political theorists, theologians and historians have focused on political 
theology, Agamben tries to bring to light the economic signature of government derived 
from the second paradigm. Indeed, Agamben starts his genealogy of the governmental 
machine from the crucial role that the Greek notion of oikonomia played in the theological 
debates of the first centuries concerning the doctrine of the trinity. 
In its classical Greek connotation, oikonomia means administration of the “house” – 
oikos – understood not as the modern family house but rather as a “complex organism 
composed of heterogeneous relations, entwined with each other” (Agamben 2011, 17). More 
importantly Agamben, traces from Aristotle (Agamben 2011, 17–18) the idea that in the 
Greek philosophical tradition economy differs from politics just as the oikos differs from polis – 
the city – that is to say, oikonomia is opposed to the “political”, as the art of ruling and administering 
the city (Salzani 2012, 269). Furthermore, it is important to mention that oikonomia is not       
a science, but an administrative paradigm, a praxis that implies contextual measures and 
decisions that take place and can only be understood in relation to a particular problem (cf. 
Agamben 2011). Thus, commenting on Xenophon, Agamben writes: 
Oikonomia is presented as a functional organization, an activity of management which 
is not bound to rules other than that of the orderly functioning of the house (or of the 
undertaking in question). It is this “managerial” paradigm that defines the semantic 
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sphere of the term oikonomia (as of the verb oikonomein and of the noun oikonomos) and 
determines its progressive analogical broadening outside its original meanings 
(Agamben 2011, 33). 
As Agamben shows, this notion of oikonomia is crucial in the early Christians’ discussions 
concerning the development of the doctrine of the Trinity. The point of departure is Paul’s 
use of oikonomia as an administrative activity – an oikonomia of the mystery – in his letters to 
the Corinthians. For Agamben, in these letters the term refers to the task God assigned        
to Paul: the task of “announcing the mystery of redemption hidden in the will of God that 
has now come to completion” (Agamben 2011, 23). As Agamben shows, here oikonomia does 
not acquire a teleological or a political sense, as it remains of the domain of the 
administration, and thus the Christians are in this sense, the first proper economic man (cf. 
Agamben 2011, 24). 
It is with the reversal of Paul’s formula – “the oikonomia of the mystery” – into the 
“mystery of the oikonomia” that the term ceases to be a mere analogical transposition and 
becomes a technical term whose function is to articulate the entities of the Trinity. Indeed, 
with the intervention of Hippolytus and Tertullian the technicizing of oikonomia serves to 
combat the monotheism of the Monarchians by resolving the mystery of the Trinity, not in 
ontological terms, but on economic ones, reconciling the unity of God with the figures of 
divine life: the providential organization of the world (the Holy spirit), God’s will (the Son) 
and the Father. As Agamben shows, the argument was that God, as far as his substance is 
concerned, is absolutely one, but that He is three in terms of his oikonomia, that is to say in the 
way in which He manages the divine house and life. In this sense, the articulation of           
the Trinity is conceived not in metaphysical terms, since the three divine figures are one and 
the same in status, potestas, and substantia. Rather, they differ only in form, so that the Trinity 
is itself a dispensatio, an oikonomia of the internal disposition of the divine substance: 
The mystery of divinity reveals itself to be the mystery of administration, delegation 
and government. The articulation of the divine life’s Trinity and the salvation of 
humanity are at the same time divided and inseparable. The oikonomia renders possible 
a reconciliation in which the transcendent God, at the same time one and Trinitarian, 
in order to remain transcendent, assumes an oikonomic praxiology and founds an 
immanence of government as praxis, where the mystery of sovereignty coincides with 
the history of humanity (Zartaloudis 2010, 65).  
In short, Agamben shows that early Christian theologians used the term oikonomia in order to 
solve the problem posed by the presence of three divine figures, by locating the real mystery 
not in the Being of God but in its praxis, avoiding polytheism and strict monotheism. What is 
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mysterious then is the economy itself, which ultimately becomes nothing other than the 
mystery of freedom. The history of salvation and the mystery of the Trinity are shown to 
share the same functional relation to divine oikonomia, and in this sense are complementary 
rather than contradictory. However, in avoiding a split in the Being of God, the doctrine of 
divine oikonomia introduced a different division that shapes the very form of the modern 
governmental paradigm, the division between God’s being and his action, between ontology 
and economy: “this is the secret dualism that the doctrine of oikonomia has introduced into 
Christianity, something like an original Gnostic germ, which does not concern the caesura 
between two divine figures, but rather that between God and his government of the world” 
(Agamben 2011, 53). 
For Agamben, this rupture, which was not present in the classical world, marks the 
primacy of the will that characterises the history of Western metaphysics and gives birth to 
modern ethics. What is at the core of the debate is the character of Christ, the question of 
whether he is founded in the Father or, if like him, Christ is anarchos, that is to say, without 
principle, ungrounded (Agamben 2011, 57). The thesis that has finally prevailed is that Christ 
– the Son of God, and who represents His word and action and has “assumed the economy 
of salvation” (Agamben 2011, 58) – is unfounded in the Father, is anarchos, and himself 
constitutes a mystery. The fact that Christ has no foundation means, for Agamben, that “in 
the last instance, language and praxis do not have a foundation in being” (Agamben 2011, 
59). Indeed, contrary to the Aristotelian unmoved mover, whose actions fully coincide with 
his being, Agamben shows that for the Christian forefathers God’s actions are dissociated 
from his being, and thus not only ethics but also politics become problematic. This anarchic 
nature of the divine oikonomia grounded in the fracture between God’s being and praxis, 
which makes intelligible the link that in the West unites anarchy and government, and 
therefore, “not only is something like a providential government of the world possible just 
because praxis does not have any foundation in being, but also this government – which has 
its paradigm in the Son and his oikonomia – is itself intimately anarchic” (Agamben 2011, 64). 
Therefore, what is at stake in the split between being and action is the operation of 
the governmental machine, the division between kingdom and government produced by the 
Trinitarian oikonomia, which was planned to be resolved through the providential paradigm, 
i.e. providence being the paradigm through which the division between transcendent and 
immanent is intended to be reconciled, presenting a development of the Trinitarian doctrine 
which constitutes the epistemological core of the modern paradigm of government. The idea 
of providence refers to the way in which God governs the world, and how it functions, 
according to Agamben, as a bipolar machine. The persistent feature of the theological and 
philosophical reflection on providence is the claim that God does not govern the world in     
a direct fashion, that is, by controlling every single detail of earthly beings, but through 
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universal principles. These universal and transcendent laws – ordinatio – are complemented 
with a particular immanent providence entrusted to the angels – executio – forming the two 
poles of the divine government of the world. The activity of government is therefore both 
providential, in the transcendental sense, and fateful, in terms of the distribution and 
administration of the universal principles: “the governmental machine functions like an 
incessant theodicy, in which the Kingdom of providence legitimates and founds the 
Government of fate, and the later guarantees that the order of the former has established and 
renders it operative” (Agamben 2011, 129).  
In other words, fate as a special providence, and universal principles as a general 
providence, constitute a bipolar system, which produces an “area of undecidability between 
what is general and what is particular, between what is calculated and what is non-wanted” 
(Agamben 2011, 141). Governance is possible only through the production of this zone of 
indistinction, which is why the ontology of an act of government is, for Agamben, “vicarious 
ontology, in the sense that, within the economical paradigm, every power has a vicarious 
character, deputizes for another [fa le veci di un altro]. This means that there is not a ‘substance’ 
of power but only an ‘economy’ of it” (Agamben 2011, 141).  
This, then, is how Agamben proposes to read the maxim “The king reigns, but he 
does not govern”. That is to say, contrary to the Foucaultian call to “cut off the king’s head in 
political theory” and to the opposite reading from Schmittian political theology – which 
asserts the foundation of sovereign power – Agamben proposes to read it as a reaffirmation 
of the double structure of an act of government, the interaction between an always limited 
and impotent sovereignty with an anarchical oikonomia, being and praxis, transcendence and 
immanence. The roi mehaignié, the doctrine of the rex inutilis and the fisher king are paradigmatic 
cases of this structure, representing the mutilated, useless and absent king: 
The transcendence of the King in his persona ficta (his sovereign body) entailed itself an 
internal fracture between being and praxis […], the persona ficta of the King had no 
origin other than in the empty throne, the anarchic time-space of sovereignty, the 
image of a do-nothing King (Zartaloudis 2010, 95). 
Even if the king’s head is cut off we will still have an empty throne, and the government of 
men is only possible if the kingdom and the government are imbricated. In this sense, as 
Zartaloudis writes, “from the inception of neoliberalism to the current dissolution of the 
nation state, what takes place is not a mere retreat of the State of sovereignty but                
the assumption of oikonomic practices and techniques of the whole political life while 
maintaining a functional relation to a transcendental righteousness” (Zartaloudis 2010, 168). 
The questions which remain unanswered then, are: What does this genealogy of economic 
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theology tell us about power? And how can we articulate Agamben’s work into an analysis of 
neoliberalism and governance?  
Neoliberalism, governance and divine management: the lessons of  
The Kingdom and the Glory  
In a short article entitled Divine Management: Critical Remarks on Giorgio Agamben’s “The Kingdom 
and the Glory” (2011), Alberto Toscano discarded Agamben’s genealogy of economic theology 
as being mute about the “constitutively unmanageable economies (chrematistic) that 
management (oikonomia) seeks to govern” (Toscano 2011, 132). For him, Agamben’s analysis 
is incapable of grasping the “anarchic order of capital accumulation” and provides no insight 
into “the (value) forms that determine the (dis)order of the contemporary economy” 
(Toscano 2011, 132). Although I will not respond directly to Toscano’s Marxist critique of 
Agamben, I will refute the general coordinates of his work in the context of affirming the 
pertinence of The Kingdom and the Glory for a radical critique of contemporary politics and 
economics.  
In a nutshell, Toscano’s argument is that Agamben’s genealogy of economic 
theology fails to incorporate chrematistics, that is, the science of “accumulation, circulation 
and interest that is opposed to the managerial stability of the paradigm of oikonomia” 
(Toscano 2011, 130), and hence it becomes incapable of a “total critique of the status quo” 
(Toscano 2011, 125). More importantly, however, according to Toscano Agamben’s failure to 
register the logics of accumulation – chrematistics – into his genealogy reinforces the “tired 
idea” of presenting Marxism as the “secularization” of hidden theological concepts:  
The signatures just aren’t there. Neither capitalism nor Marx’s theory thereof can be 
encompassed by the notion of oikonomia and its genealogies, theological or otherwise, 
and it does not suffice to combine political theology with economic theology to 
overcome the shortcomings of Agamben’s work as a tool for politically thinking the 
present (Toscano 2011, 132). 
Two things are striking here. In the first place, Toscano’s reading of the notion of 
secularization does not do justice to Agamben’s use of signatures as methodological tools. 
The signature of secularization does not merely show how economic theological concepts 
move and operate through, for instance, Marxism. Rather, as William Watkin has claimed, 
our current economic processes are accessible through their origins in the paradigm of 
economic theology only “inasmuch as these origins themselves are made accessible for the 
first time by our present situation” (Watkin 2014, 216). In other words, secularization founds 
its own foundations in a retrospective process, whereby “theological economy is possible 
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only as the origin of profane economy because profane economy allows this to be an 
operative structure of meaning” (Watkin 2014, 216).  
Thus a signature is not a concept, nor the hidden content of a concept, but rather     
a process of transference whereby a concept or discourse is transposed from one domain to 
another “through a series of shifts, substitutions and displacements” (Fuggle 2009, 86). 
Signatures, contrary to Toscano’s reading of Agamben, do not respond to the logic of cause 
and effect, and they are not “the sources” of modern concepts. Hence, it would be pointless 
to accept Toscano’s invitation to consider “what an attention to their theological precursors 
would have to tell us about modern concepts of economic order – for instance Hayek’s 
notorious neoliberal ontology of spontaneous order” (Toscano 2011, 130).  
Indeed, what Agamben has shown with the notion of secularization is that 
signatures also work backwards through time, and therefore “the thesis according to which 
the economy could be a secularized theological paradigm acts retrospectively on theology 
itself” (Agamben 2011, 3). In short, Toscano is defending Marxism from accusations he does 
not entirely understand. Agamben is certainly not trying to “perpetuate the tired idea of 
Marx’s thought as a secularization of some cloaked and damning theological content” 
(Toscano 2011, 132), for the simple reason that this is not how signatures work, thus for 
Agamben secularization does not reveal “an identity of substance between theology and 
modernity” (Agamben 2011, 4). Indeed, in The Signature of All Things Agamben makes it clear 
that in the debates between Hans Blumenberg, Karl Löwith and Carl Schmitt on the notion 
of the secularization of the 1960s, none of them realized that secularization was not               
a concept “in which the ‘structural identity’ between theological and political conceptuality 
(Schmitt’s thesis) or the discontinuity between Christian theology and modernity (this was 
Blumenberg’s thesis contra Löwith) was in question” (Agamben 2009, 77). Rather, Agamben 
treats this concept as a signature, as a “strategic operator that marked political concepts in 
order to make them refer to their theological origins” (Agamben 2009, 77)1. 
Secondly, by insisting on the relevance of chrematistics, Toscano is knocking at an 
open door. Indeed, Agamben would not deny the importance of capital accumulation, the 
logics of monetary circulation, capital flaws, or the anarchic regimens of interests for           
the understanding of the economic behaviour. Instead, the problem that concerns Agamben 
in The Kingdom and the Glory exceeds that of money as a real abstraction, however important 
                                               
1 Needless to say, by the notion of  “origin” Agamben is not referring to a chronological point but rather 
to a “moment of  arising”. According to Agamben, the moment of  arising is arguably another name for the 
archē. Foucault only uses this concept to refer to the notion of  emergence in Nietzsche (Entstehung). In 
Agamben, the moment of  arising is the moment when the solidarity between historical inquiry and genealogy 
finds its maximum expression. The archē is nothing other than the moment when the historical gaze revels the 
“origin” of  a discursive formation allowing for the dispelling of  the myth of  the origin itself. Generally put 
then, the archē revels the “deep-seated structures of  Western thought as problematic, profoundly contingent 
and so surmountable” (Watkin 2014, 29). 
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that might be for an understanding of the economy. Indeed, Agamben’s project is primarily 
concerned with the question: “Why is power split?” (Agamben 2011, 100), i.e. with the dual 
structure of the governmental machine and the vicarious character of an act of government. 
Thus in order to truly undermine Agamben’s project, Toscano would need to demonstrate 
that the economic paradigm of chrematistics has influenced – or at least tells us something 
new about – the operativity of power as a signature in the West, besides its obvious 
importance for the understanding of the functioning of the economy in itself.  
Mitchell Dean has also pointed out that the theme of chrematistics appears to have 
escaped Agamben, but far from reading this omission as a refutation of Agamben’s genealogy 
of oikonomia, Dean’s analysis of financialization is presented as a corroboration of Agamben’s 
project2. Indeed, according to Dean, while Agamben recognizes the anarchic character of the 
economic order and its permanent cross-referencing to a constitutive foundation, he also 
“neglects the role of money and transformations of finance which, if they do not do so 
entirely, provide significant challenges for economic management” (Dean 2013, 219). 
However, Dean goes on to state that it is precisely the effects of chrematistics what “make 
the economic-governmental axis operable” (Dean 2013, 220). The central claim is that 
whereas Marxism regards financial crises as evidence of the necessary destruction of non-
economic social relations, “our societies display a remarkable capacity for retroversion, 
reactivation and reinvention of quasi-transcendentals in the face of the crisis” (Dean 2013, 
221). As Agamben has put it, “crisis has become an instrument of rule. It serves to legitimize 
political and economic decisions that in fact dispossess citizens and deprive them of any 
possibility of decision” (Agamben 2013, 1). In short, although chrematistics constantly 
challenges the attempts to stabilize the economic management of societies, these challenges 
do not undermine, but rather reinforce, the immanent ordering derived from the paradigm of 
oikonomia.  
Moreover, it is the paradigm of oikonomia, and not the model of chrematistics, which, 
as we have seen in the first part of this paper, defines and explains the threshold between 
transcendental sovereignty and governmentality. If today, as Thanos Zartaloudis has shown, 
the “old-European model of law and of politics as an immobile, sovereign, transcendence-
suffused grounding of social and political life has been effectively replaced by a contingent-
driven, crisis-managing form of governing as managerialism or administration” (Zartaloudis 
2010, 51), then Agamben’s genealogy of economic theology not only locates the moment of 
                                               
2  Maurizio Lazzarato has also highlighted the role of  financialization in terms of  the neoliberal 
transformations, showing that for Marxism, social relations, which are “neither purely economic or juridical are 
remnants that the capitalist machine is bound to destroy. Yet, in reality what is supposedly destined to disappear 
keeps returning to haunt a theory that in unable to foresee this” (Lazzarato 2009, 131). 
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arising of this managerial and anarchical form of power but, more importantly, in doing  
makes it a tool for politically thinking the current articulations of the two axes of power.  
Crucially, what the fracture between Being and Action and the genealogy of 
oikonomia demonstrate is that regardless of the historical configurations of the two polarities 
of the governmental machine, the two registers of power need to be present. Even if “the 
real problem, the central mystery of politics is not sovereignty, but government” (Agamben 
2011, 276), we should keep in mind that for Agamben it is only through the irreconcilable 
scission and yet mutual exposure of the two poles of the governmental machine that power 
becomes operative. Thus what the paradigm of economic theology helps to elucidate is that 
government is not a straightforward implementation of sovereign decisions. Indeed, as 
Agamben has spelt out, “the ambiguity that seems to settle the problem of government by 
presenting it as the mere execution of a general will and law has weighed negatively not only 
upon the theory, but also upon the history of modern democracy” (Agamben 2011, 276).  
In highlighting the economic theological paradigm Agamben is not simply repeating 
the call to cut off the king’s head. The Kingdom and the Glory does not reinforce pure 
“immanentism”, since an account of power that fails to articulate the transcendent registers 
of sovereign power would be incapable of thinking the antinomian inheritance of Christian 
theology. However, as Mitchel Dean has clearly shown the problem with some of the 
eminently immanent understandings of power is not that they undermine sovereign power, 
but rather that they are “drawn against a political and theological imaginary of a divine or 
worldly sovereignty as all-powerful” (Dean 2013, 167).  
Agamben, on the contrary, examines how, even under the consolidation of               
a managerial paradigm of government, the empty throne of sovereignty needs to be 
articulated for government to be possible. Thus Agamben is certainly not giving normative or 
analytical pre-eminence to either pole of the governmental machine. What Agamben shows is 
that although both political and economic theology remain functionally related, it is only 
through a genealogy of the paradigm of oikonomia that the Christian inheritance become 
intelligible. Crucially, Agamben should be taken à la lettre when, in the very preface of The 
Kingdom and the Glory, he writes that “locating government in its theological locus in the 
Trinitarian oikonomia does not mean to explain it by means of a hierarchy of causes, as if         
a more primordial generic rank would necessarily pertain to theology” (Agamben 2011, xi). 
Instead, he insists that Trinitarian oikonomia constitutes only a privileged “laboratory” for the 
analysis of the governmental machine. 
We can now return to Toscano’s critique of The Kingdom and the Glory to respond to 
its underlying question: “[B]y what right does Agamben pass from the insistence of certain 
conceptual constellations and semantic kernels across different epochs and discursive 
formations to the overarching conviction that such an archeological inquiry is of urgent 
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political significance?” (Toscano 2011, 127). As a response, I will briefly mention three 
concrete reasons why Agamben’s analysis constitutes a significant contribution to the 
understanding of our contemporary situation.  
First, by reaching beyond the chronological limits of Foucault’s genealogy of 
governmentality, Agamben is able to shed light on the self-referential constitution of political 
power. Indeed, The Kingdom and the Glory unveils this dynamic whereby the power that is 
founded as legitimate founds its own foundations. Thanos Zartaloudis, following Agamben, 
calls these particular formations of power “foundational mythologemes” and their 
recognition and scrutiny in The Kingdom and the Glory constitutes a vital contribution to 
political and juridical thinking: 
The historical, political and theoretical celebration of such mythologemes and their 
continued transmission is highly problematic since it misleads thought from 
considering the fact that it is the founded power or concepts that project the so-called 
founding referent (as their metaphysical –transcendental principle). In other words it 
is the act of founding (search for the origin or essence of authority and power, and the 
need to render them stable, infallible and ordered), which presupposes not only       
the particular form of the founded power, but also the source of its justification as if 
from an outside, higher realm that is to be rendered sacred, concealed, absolute and 
allegedly just and more powerful. Whether it is sovereignty (in despotic 
understandings of power) or the People (for instance, in democratic understandings of 
power) that are claimed as the original foundation of power, it is instead the act        
of their specific manner of presupposition by what they allegedly found and justify 
(government-administration-police) that projects their imaginary transcendence, 
absolution and perfection (Zartaloudis 2010, 185). 
One of the lessons to be learned from Agamben, then, is that government produces the 
power that founds it, or to put it in a paradoxical form, that it is the founded element what 
founds its own foundations. Needless to say, it is not only that government constantly 
actualizes the founding fiction, but also government itself is “allowed to occur because of      
a held-in-common foundation” (Watkin 2014, xi). Secondly, as has already been mentioned, 
Agamben’s genealogy of oikonomia calls into question the common assumption of Western 
political thought – and more precisely of modern democratic theory – which conceives of 
government as mere executive power. Modern democracy, for Agamben, can be seen as 
attempt to coordinate the two anarchical poles of the governmental machine within a stable 
structure, which is why it has been lost in abstractions and mythologems: “always exhilarating 
between a lack and an excess of government, always looking for a holy spirit or a charismatic 
principle that would be able to hold together the anarchic powers that it has inherited from 
Christian theology” (Agamben 2007, 1).  The Kingdom and the Glory is the first rigorous study 
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that brings together the problematic bipolar structure of power without reducing government 
to execution or celebrating it as a simple retreat of sovereign power. 
This leads us to Foucault. For Maurizio Lazzarato the most striking limitation of 
Foucault’s lectures – specifically of The Birth of Biopolitics – is that “they take for granted that 
liberalism and liberal techniques of government exist or have existed in opposition or as an 
alternative to the strategies of the state” (Lazzarato 2015, 92). Indeed, for Lazzarato, 
Foucault’s genealogy of governmentality is unable to capture the articulation between 
sovereignty and the techniques of governmentality, thus demonstrating that “the supposedly 
immanent functioning of production and the market has always depended on the 
intervention of sovereignty” (Lazzarato 2015, 92). For Lazzarato, the analysis of 
governmentality should therefore focus on “the alliance between the state and capital 
(between the state and the market, as economist would say) and, therefore, on state 
capitalism” (Lazzarato 2015, 93). As has been demonstrated, Agamben’s theological 
genealogy of oikonomia allows for an analysis of power in terms of the articulation, alliance, 
and mutual dependency of both sovereignty and government, or more specifically, of the 
strategies of the state and the liberal techniques of government. 
And finally, part of the significance of Agamben’s theological genealogy of economy 
and government lies in the fact that it opens up a theoretical terrain from which to rethink 
neoliberalism as a political rationality that re-articulates, in a novel way, the two axes of 
power. Indeed, most of the Foucaultian studies of neoliberalism have focused on the modes 
of subjectification and the different technologies of governing that constitute this political 
rationality which renders inoperative the juridico-institutional understanding of sovereignty. 
They inquire into the patterns, the strategies, and the techniques of government that allow 
the extension of a market rationality into different domains of social, political and even 
biological life. Less attention has been given to the transcendent registers of sovereignty that 
are reconstituted through acts of government under neoliberalism. However, what has taken 
place with the rise of neoliberal governmentality is not a mere retreat of the State of 
sovereignty, but the assumption of economic “practices and techniques of the whole political 
life while maintaining a functional relation to a transcendental narrative” (Zartaloudis 2010, 
168). 
When analysed through the filter of the governmental machine, neoliberalism can be 
located within a larger spectrum of the political shifts and configurations of sovereignty and 
government. The genealogy of oikonomia provides a robust framework for understanding the 
reasons why, under neoliberalism, governance “re-conceives the political as a field of 
management or administration” (Brown 2015, 127). Yet Agamben’s investigation reminds us 
that neoliberalism does not merely operate through an immanent administration, but that 
government, even when it is suffused with governance, effectively produces the power which 
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grounds it (Watkin 2014, 210), creating at points the illusion of transcendent registers or 
simply presenting itself as its own justification. 
Crucially, the distinction between sovereign legislative power and governmental 
executive power, through which the state inherits the dual structure of the governmental 
machine, mutates into a new form under neoliberalism. The Kingdom and the Glory becomes 
decisive precisely for its understanding of the particular articulation of oikonomia and political 
theology that neoliberalism keeps in motion. What Agamben helps us elucidate is that 
government under neoliberalism is only possible as a twofold machine, so even if the 
economic managerial pole of the governmental machine – governance – reaches a higher 
degree of pre-eminence, sovereign registers still need to be articulated in the acts of 
government. In short, neoliberalism can be understood as new configuration of the 
relationship between sovereignty and governmentality, as representing “a new stage in         
the union of capital and the state, of sovereignty and the market, whose realization can be 
seen in the management of the current crisis” (Lazzarato 2015, 94). 
Without contesting the triumph of divine management or giving analytical priority to 
the law, Agamben’s genealogy of oikonomia provides a different angle for the study of 
neoliberalism, one that highlights the existence, in the background, of the headless king,         
a king who reigns but does not govern, and to whom the acts of government keep referring. 
In particular, what appears perhaps more clearly in Agamben’s genealogy of governmentality 
than in Foucault’s is that the state and the law cannot be reduced to “historical residues 
masking the real operation of the new powers, archaic leftovers of feudalism and absolutism 
and the struggles around them” (Dean 2013, 68). Indeed, if the law and the claim to 
sovereign transcendence of the state were nothing more than a complex set of techniques of 
government, if they were totally governmentalized, then why, even under neoliberalism, 
would “local, immanent exercise of power keep referring to the state as a source of its 
authority and legitimacy, and why does it need to wrap itself in the symbols, traditions, 
hierarchies and topologies of the law?” (Dean 2013, 68). 
Neoliberal government, as Lazzarato shows, “centralizes and multiplies authoritarian 
government techniques, rivaling the policies of so-called totalitarian or ‘planning’ states” 
(Lazzarato 2015, 95). Moreover, as the economic crisis of 2007 demonstrates, neoliberalism is 
not only compatible with, but relies upon, a strong state, and it relies as well on sovereign 
interventions. For Lazzarato, the crisis has made clear that the capitalist apparatus “has no 
reason to replace the state”. The problem is rather how to integrate the state’s sovereignty, 
administrative and legal functions into a new governmentality whose administration it is not 
entirely responsible for (Lazzarato 2015, 127). 
The same could be said of what Foucault describes as liberal governmentality, so 
that rather than consisting of “the maximum limitation of the forms and domains of 
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government action” (Foucault 2008, 21), liberalism has always relied upon much more than 
an invisible hand. Indeed, the crisis “has largely undercut the notion that the problem of 
liberalism is ‘governing too much’, and that critique should focus on ‘the irrationality peculiar 
to excessive government’ and that, as a consequence, one must govern as little as possible” 
(Lazzarato 2015, 105). So to put it in Agambenian terms, even if liberalism represents            
a tendency that pushes to an extreme the supremacy of the pole of the “immanent order-
government-stomach” the pole of the “transcendent God-Kingdom-brain” is still present in 
an empty form, and so “the economy that is derived from it will not thereby have 
emancipated itself from its providential paradigm” (Agamben 2011, 285):  
The two planes remain correlated in the alleged mode in which the first founds, 
legitimates and makes possible the second (as its condition of possibility); and in turn 
the second realizes concretely the causes and effects of the general (sovereign) 
decisions of the divine will. The government of the world is this mythologeme of 
functional correlation (Zartaloudis 2010, 81–82). 
The turn from liberalism to neoliberal governmentality has intensified the process whereby 
the state is suffused with an economic logic, but rather than presenting a conflict between the 
immanent anarchical pole of government and the transcendent suffused pole of sovereignty, 
neoliberalism has effectively integrated them. This is clear, for instance, in the “convergence 
between finance, as the expression of the power of capital, as the politics of capital, and 
money, as the expression of the sovereign power of the state” (Lazzarato 2015, 116). In order 
to fully understand the neoliberal arrangement of sovereignty and government, neoliberalism 
should not be interpreted according to an opposition of politics, the juridico-institutional 
apparatus of the state and the economy, but rather in light of the constant need for their 
articulation, even when one pole clearly dominates the other. More importantly, this is also 
true for liberal governmentality, even though liberalism has presented itself in terms of the 
conflict between the state and political economy. For Agamben, this is evident in                
the metaphor of the invisible hand. Indeed, Smith’s image of the invisible hand should be 
understood as  
[…] the action of an immanent principle, our reconstruction of the bipolar machine of 
the theological oikonomia has shown that there is no conflict between providentialism 
and naturalism within it, because the machine functions precisely by correlating          
a transcendence principle with an immanent order. Just as with the Kingdom and the 
Government, the intradivine trinity and the economic trinity, so the brain and         
the stomach are nothing but two sides of the same apparatus, of the same oikonomia, 
within which one of the two poles can, at each turn, dominate the other (Agamben 
2011, 284). 
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In short, modernity – and with it, liberalism – by removing God from the world has not only 
“failed to leave theology behind, but in some ways has done nothing than lead the project of 
the providential oikonomia to completion” (Agamben 2011, 287). And if we see under 
neoliberalism the reappearance of the state through, for instance, the constant need for legal 
intervention in the market and the management of public debt, this only unveils the fact that 
from the beginning economic liberalism, from which neoliberalism has emerged, could not 
have been consolidated in direct opposition to the techniques of governmentality and the 
strategies of the state. The Kingdom and the Glory provides a genealogy of political power that 
articulates the political theological paradigm of sovereignty and the managerial-providential 
paradigm of economic theology, capturing the bipolar character of the governmental 
machine.    
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